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REWORKING THE UNWORKABLE:
HALLIBURTON II AND THE
COURT’S REEXAMINATION OF
FRAUD ON THE MARKET
*

MARIANA ESTÉVEZ
I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2002, the Erica P. John Fund, Inc., brought a
securities fraud class action against Halliburton Company and its
1
President, David Lesar. The case reached the Supreme Court for the
2
first time in 2011 on the issue of class certification and was vacated
3
and remanded for further proceedings. Now, nearly twelve years after
its initiation, the case returns to the Supreme Court’s docket as
4
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II) for yet
another examination of issues related to class certification. This time,
however, the Court’s disposition could signify “the possible death of a
cause of action that has been the centerpiece of private securities
5
litigation for the last forty years.”
6
7
Twenty-six years ago, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme
*J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, class of 2015. I would like to thank
Professor Elisabeth de Fontenay, Todd Noelle, and Adam Fine for their thoughtful guidance
and conscientious editing.
1. Moore v. Halliburton Co., No 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *9
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 9, 2004), vacated sub nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. 131 S.
Ct. 2179 (2011).
2. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (“Whether
securities fraud plaintiffs must prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification.”).
3. Id. at 2187.
4. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. argued Mar. 5, 2014).
5. Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market?: Reflections on
Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper No. 13-058, Nov. 16, 2013, at 2 (hereinafter Judgment Day).
6. Halliburton was argued before the Supreme Court on March 5, 2014, almost twenty-six
years to the day after the Basic opinion, which adopted the fraud on the market rule, was
handed down on March 7, 1988.
7. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Only three justices joined Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Basic; however, because only six justices heard the case, the four-justice
opinion constitutes a majority opinion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United
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Court adopted “the fraud on the market” rule. This rule presumes that
investors who traded in an efficient market relied on all public
material information about a company when they purchased its stock.
This presumption saves plaintiffs the trouble of proving that they
were individually aware of any particular misstatement, and in the
case of class actions, opens the door for them to bring suit.
The fraud on the market rule finds its foundation in the efficient
capital markets hypothesis — the theory that efficient markets
8
incorporate all material public information into market price. This
theory does not discriminate between accurate and misstated
information disclosed by company trading in an efficient market.
Thus, even misstatements, if material and publicly disclosed, are
presumed to be incorporated into an efficient market’s stock prices.
All investors who traded in an efficient market can be presumed to
have relied on all material information, including misstated
9
information.
Halliburton and Lesar, Petitioners in Halliburton II, urge the
Court to revisit the questionable economic foundation of the fraud on
the market rule, and thus overrule Basic to the extent that it
10
recognizes this presumption of classwide reliance. Eliminating this
presumption would arguably require individualized proof of reliance
at class certification, all but preventing plaintiffs from proceeding
11
under the class action mechanism. Despite the potential implications
States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of
whom shall constitute a quorum.”).
8. Id. at 242.
9. Id. at 247.
10. Brief of Petitioners at 3, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S.
Dec. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Merits Brief of Petitioner].
11. See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1209 (2013)
(“Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption is highly significant because it makes securitiesfraud class actions possible by converting the inherently individual reliance inquiry into a
question common to the class, which is necessary to satisfy the dictates of [Federal] Rule [of
Civil Procedure] 23(b)(3).”) (Thomas, J., concurring). Scholars suggest that plaintiffs could
nevertheless bring securities class actions under Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972), which allows a presumption of reliance in cases alleging material omissions rather than
misstatements as the basis of fraud, but the viability of this alternative remains hotly debated.
See Ann Lipton, A reasonable facsimile thereof, L. PROFESSORS BLOGS NETWORK (Feb. 15,
2014)
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/02/a-reasonable-facsimilethereof.html (“I don’t see how much of a role [Affiliated Ute] can play with respect to
substituting for Basic.”). See also Claire Loebs Davis, Halliburton: Is the Fix as Basic as Alleging
Omissions under Affiliated Ute? Or is That Too Cute?, D&O DISCOURSE (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/01/28/halliburton-is-the-fix-as-basic-as-alleging-omissionsunder-affiliated-ute-or-is-that-too-cute/ (“Affiliated Ute does not offer a quick fix to the
potential elimination of Basic’s fraud-on-the market presumption.”). See also,
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of such a holding, some members of the Court are eager to revisit
12
Basic’s controversial holding.
Parts II and III of this commentary introduce Halliburton II’s
factual and legal background, respectively. Part IV outlines the
arguments of Petitioners and Respondents, and Part V builds on these
arguments and recommends that the Court overrule Basic. Finally,
Part V reframes the disagreement between the majority and dissent in
Basic and predicts, through that lens, that the Court in Halliburton II
will not overrule Basic, but will likely modify Basic's presumption to
require plaintiffs to prove that the alleged misstatement or omission
actually affected market price in order to earn the benefit of the
presumption.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In this case, Respondents allege that Halliburton used falsified
financial statements to mislead the public about “(1) its liability for
asbestos claims, (2) its probability of collecting revenue on
unapproved claims on fixed-price construction contracts; and (3) the
13
benefits of its merger with Dresser Industries.” According to the
complaint, defendants understated their exposure to asbestos liability,
14
downplaying the potential adverse impact of pending judgments.
They included in its revenues $98 million worth of unapproved and
15
likely unrecoverable claims.
Most significantly, on December 7, 2001, Halliburton’s stock price
decreased by 42% following the announcement of a $30 million
16
verdict from asbestos claims against the company. Several market
analysts reported the price drop as the market’s reaction to the news:

12. See, e.g., id. at 1204 (“[M]ore recent evidence suggests that the presumption may rest
on a faulty economic premise . . . In light of this development, reconsideration of the Basic
presumption may be appropriate.”) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1206 (“Today’s holding does
not merely accept what some consider the regrettable consequences of the four-Justice opinion
in Basic; it expands those consequences from the arguably regrettable to the unquestionably
disastrous.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1209 n.4 (“The Basic decision itself is questionable . . .
but the court has not been asked to revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. I thus limit
my dissent to demonstrating that the Court is not following Basic’s dictates.”) (Thomas, J.
dissenting).
13. Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 9, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
No. 13-317 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Cert. Brief of Respondents].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 10.
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17

a manifestation of investors’ loss of faith in the company.
Nevertheless, analysts disagree about the proportionality of the
18
market’s response. While some suggested the 42% drop might have
19
been an overreaction, others withheld judgment.

That day Moody’s, one of the nationally recognized credit rating
20
agencies, downgraded Halliburton’s credit rating. It is unclear
whether the downgrade independently affected Halliburton’s stock
21
price or whether it simply reflected the asbestos verdicts. However,
as an independent event that could have contributed to the price
decrease, the downgrade casts doubt on any event studies seeking to
determine the actual impact the asbestos judgments might have had
22
on Halliburton’s stock price.
Halliburton stock, which trades on the New York Stock Exchange,
23
is closely monitored and has 848 million shares outstanding.
Additionally, a regression analysis of thirty-one instances of
Halliburton-specific stock movement suggested that the stock price
24
“as a general matter react[s] promptly to unexpected news.” Large
fluctuations in Halliburton’s stock price, therefore, can be associated
25
as a general rule with material, unexpected information.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange

17. Id.
18. Id. at app. 23a While both parties refer to the event as a “downgrade,” it is unclear
whether the downgrade was actually referring to a change in Halliburton’s credit, or simply a
projection reflecting the likelihood that the rating would remain unchanged. The change
actually took place in the “rating outlook,” which changed from “stable” to “negative.” Id. at
25a–26a.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id. at app. 25a.
22. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 CHI. L. REV. 611, 627–28 (1985) (identifying intervening causes as complicating factors that
render less reliable the event studies used to determine impact of firm-specific news on stock
pice).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. It is undisputed that plaintiffs may not invoke fraud on the market where the stock
did not trade on an efficient market, so plaintiffs allege with that this specific stock traded on an
efficient market before they can resort to fraud on the market.
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Act) to protect investors from unsavory practices by securities
27
issuers largely as a response to the Great Depression and stock
28
market crash of 1929. The Exchange Act established the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the capital markets and
address excessive speculation, unfair practices, and inadequate
29
disclosure in the markets after the initial offering of securities.

More specifically, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the
use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission may prescribe” and “in connection with the
30
purchase or sale of any security.” Pursuant to this authority, the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which proscribes the use of the mail, a
national security exchange, or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to manipulate or deceive investors in connection
31
with the purchase or sale of a security. In essence, Rule 10b-5 makes
any securities fraud actionable, within the full jurisdictional breadth of
the Commerce Clause.
B. The Supreme Court’s § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence
Despite the fact that neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5
explicitly establishes a private cause of action, courts have long
inferred a civil claim and remedy for securities fraud based on Section
32
10 and Rule 10b-5. In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
33
Casualty Co., the Supreme Court recognized this claim for the first
time, but relegated its only affirmative statement adopting the private
34
cause of action to a single footnote. Despite this recognition, the
Court subsequently restricted the claim by mandating standing
35
requirements in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores and
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C.A § 78app (West 2013)).
27. Id.
28. H. R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3 (1934).
29. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j (West 2014).
31. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2014).
32. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
33. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
34. Id. at 14 n.9 (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under §
10(b).”).
35. 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (limiting the right action to actual purchasers and sellers of
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36

imposing a scienter requirement in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.
With time, the elements of the cause of action have crystalized into
(1) a material misrepresentation, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance (or transaction
37
causation), (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.
Properly understood, the fourth and sixth elements of the cause of
action require the plaintiff to establish two different types of
causation. First, “transaction causation,” also known as “reliance,”
addresses the relationship between a misrepresentation and the
38
plaintiff’s decision to invest in the company. Second, “loss causation”
refers to “a causal connection between the material misrepresentation
39
and the loss,” and is considered commensurate with proximate cause.
Transaction causation requires plaintiffs to prove that they relied
on a material misstatement or omission when they engaged in the
40
transaction that caused their loss. In other words, they must prove
that but for the material misstatement or omission, they would not
41
have engaged in the transaction that caused their loss. This
requirement makes it impossible for securities fraud suits to be
brought as class actions because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
conditions class certification on proof that “questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting
42
only individual members.” Reliance turns on factual information
specific to each class member, causing questions that affect individual
43
members to predominate over common factual issues.
In the 1988 case of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court departed from
the cautious approach that yielded the scienter and standing
requirements in Blue Chip Stamp and Ernst, and endorsed the “fraud
44
on the market rule.” The rule, which had been applied in lower

securities).
36. 425 U.S. at 193 (declining to recognize a right of action for aiding and abetting under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where the defendant lacked intent to defraud).
37. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341•42 (2005).
38. Id. at 341•42.
39. Id.
40. James Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on
Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1739•40 (2013).
41. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (suggesting that without fraud on the market, a plaintiff would
have to prove “how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed or
if the misrepresentation had not been made.”).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
43. Amgen Inc. v. Conn.Et. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013).
44. Basic, Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1988).
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courts but never before recognized by the Supreme Court, permits
trial courts to accept a rebuttable presumption of classwide reliance if
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the stock at issue trades in an efficient
45
market.
The adoption of the fraud on the market rule benefitted plaintiffs
in two ways. First, it relieved them of the “unrealistic evidentiary
46
burden” of proving how they would have acted had there not been a
misstatement or omission. Second, this rule made securities fraud
suits practicable by making the class action mechanism available to
47
securities fraud plaintiffs. This proved crucial to the practicability of
securities fraud suits because “most claimants’ losses are not large
48
enough to justify the expense of their individual prosecution.” In
49
these two ways, Basic greatly liberalized access to the 10b-5 claim,
50
which generated a dramatic increase in litigation and induced
Congress to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
51
1995 (PSLRA). The PLSRA instituted heightened procedural, audit,
and disclosure requirements to decrease abusive litigation, reduce
52
coercive settlements, and better detect fraud.
Applying the PLSRA, the Supreme Court held in Dura
53
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo that plaintiffs must “adequately
allege and prove” loss causation to prevail in a private securities class
54
action. Under Dura, it is insufficient for plaintiffs to show that a
material misrepresentation inflated market price because the mere
distortion of market price at the date of purchase does not prove that
55
the misrepresentation was the proximate cause of an economic loss.
More recently yet, private securities litigation has focused on the
interaction among the class certification requirements under the
56
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the fraud on the market
45. Id. at 248 (1988).
46. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
47. Cox, supra note 40 at 1721.
48. Cox, supra note 40 at 1721.
49. Id. at 261 (admonishing that the Court is making the claim available to too broad a set
of plaintiffs) (White, J., dissenting).
50. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 151, 179 (2009) [hereinafter Basic at Twenty].
51. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18 U.S.C.).
52. Id.
53. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
54. Id. at 346.
55. Id. at 342.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.

ESTEVEZ COMMENTARY 06 15 14 V FINAL READ - TODD (DO NOT DELETE)

228

6/17/2014 10:52 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 9

presumption, and the remaining elements of a Section 10(b) claim.
This focus has been driven by the question of whether the remaining
elements of the claim pose obstacles to class certification. The first
time this case reached the Supreme Court in Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I) the Court held that plaintiffs can be
certified as a class without proving that the defendant’s
misrepresentation actually caused economic loss because the actual
cause of the loss “has nothing to do with whether an investor relied
57
on the misrepresentation.”
Further, in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
58
Funds, the Court also allowed a class to be certified without proof
59
that the alleged misstatements were material. In that case, the Court
reasoned that materiality is an objective inquiry that can be
60
established through evidence common to the class. In other words,
failure to prove that a misstatement is material does not cause
individual issues to predominate; it destroys the 10b-5 claim for all
61
plaintiffs. This inquiry, then, is entirely unlike the reliance inquiry.
Under the reliance inquiry, the class’s failure to attain the fraud on
the market presumption does not end the case. With materiality,
however, failure to earn the presumption defeats class certification
62
automatically.
Amgen reveals the gravity of the tension between Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 and the fraud on the market rule. Although the
Court ultimately held that materiality was a merits issue not
appropriate for the class certification stage, three Justices dissented,
arguing materiality is necessary to earn the presumption of reliance in
63
fraud on the market cases. Where plaintiffs fail to show that a
misrepresentation was material and therefore that it was incorporated
into market price under the efficient capital markets hypothesis, fraud
on the market fails. Thus, common issues do not predominate and the
64
class cannot be certified. In all likelihood, such claims would be

57. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). This differs from
the holding in Dura where the Court was not concerned with class certification but with success
on the merits. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
58. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
59. Id. at 1191.
60. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195.
61. Id. at 1196.
62. Id. at 1199.
63. Id. at 1209 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1209–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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“dead on arrival.”
Halliburton II picks up where Amgen left off. In Halliburton II,
the Court will decide: (1) whether to overrule or modify Basic’s
presumption of reliance based on the fraud on the market theory; and
(2) whether the defendant may rebut the presumption of reliance in a
fraud on the market case at the class certification stage by introducing
evidence to disprove the allegation that an alleged misrepresentation
distorted the market price of the stock.
IV. ARGUMENTS
B. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners contend that the efficient capital markets hypothesis,
the foundation for Basic’s presumption of reliance, is empirically
invalid. Therefore, they urge, the Court should take one of three
66
paths: (1) overrule the presumption; (2) modify it to turn on price
67
impact rather than market efficiency; or, at the very least, (3) allow
Petitioners to rebut it at the class certification stage by presenting
68
evidence disproving price impact.
Petitioners begin by identifying and debunking the two premises
of the efficient capital markets hypothesis: (1) that efficient markets
incorporate all public material misrepresentations into market price
and (2) that investors rely on the integrity of this price when they
69
trade on the market.
Petitioners cite empirical evidence suggesting that capital markets
do not incorporate all types of public material information at equal
70
speeds or with any degree of rationality. To begin with, investors’
attempts to “beat the market” cause price to fluctuate irrationally,
71
severing the link between material information and market price.
Additionally, practices such as “noise trading” and computerized
72
trading, which by definition rely on bases other than information
65. Id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. Merits Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 35.
67. Id. at 37.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 10.
70. See id. at 17 (illustrating that market prices respond differently to the disclosure of the
same piece of information depending on the method of disclosure).
71. Id. at 19.
72. “[Noise trading refers to] trad[ing] on things other than material information about the
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about the issuer, also contribute to this irrationality.
Moreover, Petitioners argue, to the extent market efficiency is
73
present, it exists not as a binary condition but on a spectrum.
Markets operate efficiently some of the time with respect to some
types of information; therefore, courts are misguided in presuming
74
reliance on all public material misrepresentations. Such a
presumption is necessarily both over- and under-inclusive because the
general efficiency of a market does not bear directly on whether a
75
particular misrepresentation affected market price. As an example,
Petitioners cited the publication of a high profile New York Times
article detailing a company’s progress in cancer research. Following
this publication stock price increased from $12 per share to $52 per
share despite the fact that the very same information had been
published five months earlier in a scientific magazine as well as in a
76
lower profile article in the New York Times. If the market had fully
incorporated the information when it was first published, it would not
have responded to its republication, no matter how prominent.
Accordingly, the sole fact that a market is efficient does not
guarantee that it responds to all material public information. A
market's efficiency does not automatically bear on whether a
77
particular investor relied on the market price. An investor does not
indirectly rely on the information by relying on the market price. To
Petitioners, the very fact that investors employ a variety of tactics to
“beat the market” and take advantage of its inefficiencies suggests
that the second premise of the efficient capital markets hypothesis
78
cannot be absolute. While some investors may trade in reliance on
company . . . . [Computerized trading] us[es] complex algorithms that aim to beat the market,
executing trades based on predetermined metrics, not rationally assimilating public disclosures.”
Id. at 19–20.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 20–21.
75. Id. The Petitioners elaborate on this problem with market efficiency:
If a market for a given stock is generally inefficient or undeveloped, defendants who
made affirmative misrepresentations may escape certification and liability, even if the
misrepresentation unquestionably distorted the stock’s price. . . . Yet, . . . if a stock
trades on a market that is generally efficient or well-developed, that says little about
whether it was efficient with respect to a particular misrepresentation and whether the
market in fact reacted to the information.
Id. at 21.
76. Id. at 17. For a detailed description of instances of over- and under-inclusiveness see
Lucian A. Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. L. (forthcoming May 2014)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371304.
77. Merits Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 17.
78. Id. at 16.
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market price, others decidedly do not, and that fact alone renders
79
Basic’s foundation a fiction.
Petitioners argue in the alternative that if the Court is unwilling to
overrule the presumption altogether, it should at least modify it to
require plaintiffs to show that the misrepresentation actually distorted
80
market price. This modification would accord not only with modern
81
financial economic theory as described above, but also with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s requirement that plaintiffs prove
common issues predominate over issues specific to individual class
82
members.
Were the Court to preserve the presumption as formulated in
Basic, Petitioners maintain it should nevertheless allow defendants to
rebut the presumption at the class certification stage by presenting
83
evidence that the misrepresentations did not affect market price.
This is consistent with Amgen’s holding that certain elements of a
10b-5, such as materiality, are not relevant to class certification and
84
should not be addressed at that stage. Where plaintiffs cannot prove
that the misrepresentation actually distorted market price, they can
nevertheless sustain a claim for fraud by presenting direct evidence of
85
reliance. Successful rebuttal of price distortion, therefore, does not
immediately defeat a plaintiff’s claim but does cause individual issues
to predominate over issues common to a class, making the inquiry
86
directly relevant to class certification.
Petitioners advance a variety of policy arguments in support of
overruling Basic’s presumption. Echoing Justice White’s dissent in
Basic, Petitioners emphasize the difficulties courts face performing
the complex and imprecise analysis necessary to establish market
79. See id. (“[S]ome investors rely on market integrity and others do not.”) (quoting
Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 923, 926 (1989)).
80. Id. at 37 (citing Halliburton I and Amgen for the proposition that investor reliance is
necessarily premised on a misrepresentation’s actually having distorted market price).
81. Id. at 38–39; see supra, notes 70–75 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 39.
83. Id. at 49; see also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
10–11, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2013) [hereinafter
Brief of Law Professors].
84. Id. at 49–50.
85. See id. at 52 (“[W]here the defendant directly shows that he misrepresentations did not
distort the market price[,] plaintiffs can still establish personal reliance and loss caution in nonfraud-on-the-market cases where misstatements were nonpublic or otherwise did not affect an
exchange-traded price.”).
86. Id. at 53.
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87

efficiency. They also raise concerns about the increased likelihood of
88
in terrorem or “blackmail” settlements in Rule 10b-5 litigation: the
fear that the cost of litigation after a class has been certified will be so
high that it might coerce defendants to settle even where plaintiffs’
claims are weak. They further cite the failure of class actions both to
89
90
compensate investors and to deter fraudulent misrepresentations as
compelling reasons to abandon the presumption. Finally, they note,
the fact that Congress neither directly created, nor explicitly adopted
a private cause of action for securities fraud leaves to the Court the
91
responsibility to amend or overrule the doctrine.
B. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents track their counterparts’ arguments closely. They
begin by defending Basic as correctly decided and addressing policy
concerns associated with eliminating the presumption. Next, they
maintain that the shortcomings of the efficient capital markets
hypothesis does not warrant overruling Basic. Finally, they argue that
the Court should not modify the presumption to turn on price impact
92
because doing so would contravene recent precedent.
Basic’s adoption of the fraud on the market rule came at a time
when the efficient market hypothesis enjoyed widespread
93
acceptance. This principle, therefore, informed both the structure of
securities legislation and earlier attempts by the Court to execute
94
Congress’s legislative intent. Therefore, Respondents continue,
overruling Basic would have disastrous effects not only for private
95
96
securities suits, but also for public enforcement of securities laws.
First, securities regulation envisions a system of disclosure premised
on the idea that information need not be released into the market
97
more than once for the market to respond to it. This regulatory

87. Id. at 22.
88. Id. at 41 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 44.
91. Id. at 32.
92. See, e.g., Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013)
(reasoning that materiality could be proved by evidence common to the class).
93. Brief of Respondents at 21, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Merits Brief of Respondents].
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Id. at 27.
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scheme arises from the efficient capital markets hypothesis, and
questioning this premise weakens the foundations of the entire
98
system.
Second, event studies, which also rely on an assumption of market
responsiveness to information, form the crux of securities fraud
99
prosecutions and other enforcement actions. Similarly here,
questioning the economic theory underlying these event studies
would jeopardize the viability of public securities enforcement as a
100
response to securities fraud. In short, Respondents do not argue
that the efficient capital markets hypothesis is the most adequate
premise upon which to base an entire scheme of securities law and
securities enforcement procedures. They argue that the securities law
and enforcement regime rely so heavily on the theory that calling it
into question would deliver a blow to the legitimacy of the system as a
whole.
Furthermore, Respondents contend that the market inefficiencies
Petitioners point to do not cast doubt on Basic’s foundational
principle that “individual security prices incorporate information in a
101
reasonably prompt way.”
Basic did not rely on the binary
conception of efficiency that Petitioners assign to it. It simply stated
the broadly accepted claim that “developed markets generally
102
respond to material information.”
Moreover, Respondents argue the Court should decline
Petitioner’s to modify Basic's presumption to make it turn on price
distortion rather than market efficiency. Doing so, Respondents
contend would be contrary to the Court’s holdings in Amgen and
103
Halliburton I. The question of price distortion is commensurate to
the question of materiality addressed in Amgen, which the court held
104
could not be adjudicated at the class certification stage. Amgen’s
rationale for keeping materiality outside of the class certification
stage applies equally to price distortion because both involve
98. Id.
99. Id. at 28.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 35; see also, Brief of Financial Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Feb. 5, 2014)
[hereinafter Brief of Financial Economists].
102. Merits Brief of Respondents, supra note 93 at 38. Petitioner’s arguments do not
distinguish between fundamental efficiency and informational efficiency, only the latter of which
is necessary for fraud on the market to stand. Id. at 34 n.17.
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id.
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objective inquiries that require common evidence. Where the inquiry
105
fails, the claim as a whole cannot succeed. Additionally, as a
practical matter, proving price impact often requires evidence that
106
can only be obtained through merits discovery.
To conclude, Respondents argue in the alternative that if the
Court decides to allow Petitioners to rebut price distortion at the class
certification stage, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the misrepresentations did not
107
distort the price of Halliburton stock.
V. ANALYSIS: THE TROUBLE WITH MODIFYING BASIC
In Halliburton II, the Court will likely modify, but not
overrule, Basic's holding—requiring that plaintiffs earn the rebuttable
presumption of reliance by demonstrating that the misrepresentation
actually distorted market price, rather than by merely demonstrating
that the stock at issue traded in an efficient market. This solution
purports to address the concerns of market efficiency skeptics while
retaining the viability of class actions for section 10(b) plaintiffs, and it
108
has consequently received a great deal of attention. Nevertheless,
the modification does not ultimately resolve the shortcomings of
Basic’s presumption. This section begins by discussing the
fundamental problem with the Basic presumption and then illustrates
how simply modifying the presumption does not sufficiently address
that concern.
A. Presumed Reliance is an Inadequate Response to Hardship of
Proof.
In his seminal paper, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the
109
Market, Donald Langevoort reframes Basic’s inquiry into the
efficient capital markets hypothesis so as to justify the presumption of
110
reliance in the face of criticism and confusion. According to
Langevoort, “the only persuasive, coherent interpretation of Basic’s
presumption” is the reading that investors rely not on the accuracy of
105. Id.
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id.
108. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. L.(forthcoming
May 2014) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371304; Brief of Law Professors, supra note 83
at 28.
109. See supra note 50.
110. Id. at 151.
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111

market price but on its integrity. In other words, investors do not
assume that market price reflects the inherent value of a firm, but
simply that it reflects material public information and that that
112
information is not fraudulent. As Langevoort notes, however, the
assumption that market price is not distorted by fraud is just as
irrational as the assumption that market price reflects inherent
113
value.
Nevertheless, Basic can stand if understood as granting investors
an entitlement to rely on price integrity as a matter of policy rather
114
than as a matter of sound economic judgment. Put differently, Basic
can be understood as granting investors the right to believe that
corporations are not manipulating information to distort market
price. According to Langevoort, this right to rely on corporate
statements parallels the right to rely on statements by strangers
115
underlying common law fraud. Just as there is no reason to trust
strangers, there is no reason to trust markets, but courts allow people
to trust both strangers and markets by creating a cause of action for
116
117
fraud. Langevoort calls this “an act of juristic grace.”
However, Langevoort does not address the difference between
the right to rely on corporate statements and actual reliance on
corporate statements. Someone who does not believe a stranger’s lies
cannot be said to have acted on those lies and should not have
recourse for fraud either in a face-to-face interaction or in connection
118
with the purchase of a security. This highlights the fundamental
problem with Basic reliance: it takes an undeserved right to rely on
price integrity, which courts have granted to every investor, and
111. Id. at 161. Langevoort notes that this reading may very well be at odds with the Court’s
intention in Basic, but it is nevertheless the only convincing reading of their opinion. Id.
112. Id. at 161.
113. Id. at 160.
114. See id. at 161 (“Whether or not it is what he was thinking, [Justice Blackmun’s policymaking justification] really is the only persuasive, coherent interpretation of Basic’s
presumption.”).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (noting plaintiffs who sold shares
because of other concerns despite believing (1) Basic’s statements were false; (2) Basic was
engaged in merger discussions, and (3) consequently that Basic stock was artificially
underpriced, “could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been
manipulated”); see also id. at 261 (“[I]t is possible that a person who heard the first corporate
misstatement and disbelieved it . . . may still be included in the plaintiff-class on remand. How
[such a person] can say that he was ‘defrauded’ by [relying] on the ’integrity’ of the market price
is beyond me.”) (White, J. dissenting).
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extrapolates from it the assumption that every investor did, in fact,
rely on price integrity. Even a showing that a misrepresentation
distorted market price does not guarantee that all members of a class
actually relied on that price.
In arguing that presumed reliance is an act of juristic grace
comparable to the act of juristic grace that created common law fraud,
Langevoort misapplies his own analogy. The act of juristic grace
commensurate to the creation of the common law fraud doctrine
occurred long before Basic when the Court first invented a private
119
cause of action for securities fraud. Presumed reliance, therefore, is
not so much an act of juristic grace as the first of many attempts by
the Court, and later Congress, to mend that tattered cloak it placed
over the shivering shoulders of securities fraud plaintiffs back in 1971.
While the presumption does make it significantly easier for
plaintiffs to bring class action suits for securities fraud, it does more
than simply recognize these plaintiffs’ right to trust the market in the
way individuals may trust each other. Rather than merely granting
investors a right to sue someone who has lied to them—as the
common law would do—Basic’s presumption grants them the right to
sue someone who has lied to a third party.
B. A Presumption of Reliance Requires Impermissible Burden-Shifting
and Procedural Complications.
Nevertheless, Langevoort is correct in saying that the Basic Court
made a policy decision in adopting the presumption of reliance. It
chose to alleviate but not fully abolish plaintiffs’ burden of proof by
allowing them to satisfy the reliance element through indirect
120
evidence of market efficiency. In Justice Blackmun’s own words,
“[r]equiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts . . . would
place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule
121
10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.” The Court
chose, therefore, to shift this “unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary
122
burden” from the plaintiff, its rightful bearer, to the defendant, who
119. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (recognizing a
private cause of action for securities fraud based on § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
120. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 73–74 (2011).
121. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
122. Id.
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is even more ill-equipped to carry it. The irony of this decision does
not appear to be entirely lost on Justice Blackmun, who went to great
lengths to justify this choice.

Presumptions, he wrote, “assist courts in managing circumstances
in which direct proof for one reason or another is rendered
123
difficult,” and they are “useful devices for allocating the burden of
124
proof between parties.” Justice Blackmun cited McCormick on
Evidence for the proposition that presumptions can be used to
125
allocate the burden of proof. However, that very source also
indicates that the considerations relevant to the initial assignment of
126
the burden bear also upon the decision to shift it. A court should
place the burden on the party who (1) has better access to a piece of
127
information and who (2) alleges the more unlikely event.
Here, both considerations weigh against presuming reliance. First,
the defendant in a securities fraud class action can proffer no
evidence as to whether any class member was aware of or believed a
misstatement. Because of the nature of the evidence required to
prove reliance, demanding that the defendant disprove reliance
requires them to produce evidence practically available only to the
plaintiff. While proving actual reliance might be “unnecessarily
unrealistic” for a group of plaintiffs acting as a class, the same
requirement verges on the impossible when placed on the defendant.
Second, although Justice Blackmun struggled to imagine an
128
investor who does not rely on market integrity, Langevoort suggests
that a reasonable investor maintains a healthy cynicism about the
market price.
Fraud and manipulation are predictable enough that it would be
foolish for anyone simply to assume that a stock price has integrity.
In an efficient market, the inevitable risk of fraud is priced and
investors are compensated for taking on the risk—the market is

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
EDWARD W. CLEARLY, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (3d ed. 1984).
Id. at § 337.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47.
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129

not assuming its absence.

In the absence of the presumption, the rational investor, aware
that market price is likely distorted by fraud, might be more cautious
or more diligent in conducting market research before accepting the
“integrity” of market price. After all, the presumption allows an
investor to sue, even if he never read or heard the alleged
misstatement.

Aware of the unsavory consequences of this burden-shifting,
Justice Blackmun emphasized time and again the fact that the
presumption of reliance is a rebuttable one, such that it does not
130
destroy all defendants’ hopes of success. To be fair to Justice
Blackmun’s formulation of the presumption, courts must allow
defendants to present evidence to rebut the presumption and prevent
131
the plaintiff from establishing it. However, the Court has held that
hearing such evidence contravenes the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure because it forces merits issues, which belong in trial or at
132
summary judgment, into the class certification stage.
Courts are therefore caught between a rock and a hard place,
forced to circumvent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if they wish
133
to remain faithful to Basic. This tension was evident in Amgen and
134
Halliburton I,
and the Court’s solution was fundamentally
unsatisfactory. In an attempt to avoid holding a quasi-trial at the class
certification stage, the Court manipulated the class certification
inquiry, effectively rendering the presumption unrebuttable, shifting
the burdens of proof and persuasion entirely to the defendant, and
doing violence both to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and to the
135
holding in Basic.
129. Langevoort, supra note 50, at 160.
130. Basic, 485 U.S. at 226, 229, 242, 245, 248, 248 n.28, 249, 250 (employing the term
“rebuttable presumption” or otherwise addressing the fact that the defendant may rebut the
presumption of reliance).
131. Id. at 250.
132. Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013).
133. Id. at 1194.
134. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011) (“The question
presented in this case is whether securities fraud plaintiffs must also prove loss causation [an
affirmative element of the claim] in order to obtain class certification.”).
135. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1206 (“The Court today allows plaintiffs to obtain certification of
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Basic, Justice Blackmun unequivocally abrogated all
responsibility for the economic underpinnings of the fraud on the
market rule. “Our task,” he wrote, “is not to assess the general validity
of the theory, but to consider whether it was proper for the courts
below to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance, supported in
136
part by the fraud-on-the-market theory.” This carefully crafted
sentence holds the key to the Court’s opinion by juxtaposing the
economic invalidity of the theory with the propriety of the
presumption. To Justice Blackmun, the validity of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis was not a necessary predicate for the presumption
of reliance to be proper. In fact, the hypothesis need only be generally
acceptable in order to buttress the presumption: “we need only
believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting
137
stock market prices.”
Therein lies the fundamental disagreement between Justice
Blackmun and Justice White. Justice Blackmun viewed the
138
presumption as a matter of equity. He was concerned that the
reliance requirement placed too heavy a burden on securities fraud
plaintiffs, so he applied an equitable remedy to reallocate the
139
burden. Beyond that, he engaged in a relatively cursory analysis of
the hypothesis consistent with his assertion that it was not for the
Court to examine.
Justice White, on the other hand, viewed the issue primarily as a
matter of law and embarked on a vehement attack on the fraud of the
140
market rule. He questioned its economic foundation, its pedigree as
judicially-created doctrine lacking affirmative Congressional

securities-fraud class actions without proof that common questions predominate over
individualized questions of reliance, . . . by all but eliminating materiality as one of the
predicates of the fraud-on-the-market theory . . . .”) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242.
137. Id. at 247 n.24 (emphasis added).
138. Thus characterized, Justice Blackmun’s view of the reliance presumption is consistent
with his broader conception of the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private cause of action articulated in
his dissent in Blue Chip Stamps. In that opinion, he rebuked the majority for barring plaintiffs
who did not actually purchase or sell securities from the private cause of action under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 and accused his fellow Justices of “exhibit[ing] a preternatural solicitousness of
corporate well-being and a seeming callousness toward the investing public.” Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975).
139. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.
140. Id. at 255–56.
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approval, and its discord with broader Congressional policy favoring
142
disclosure.
The very same dispute underlies Halliburton II. However
Petitioners in Halliburton II present the Court with a third option:
upholding the presumption of reliance but replacing the efficiency
predicate with an inquiry into actual price impact. Taking this position
would perhaps mollify the equity-driven members of the Court, but it
would also leave fundamentally unaltered the uneasy compromise
that the Basic presumption represents. Nevertheless, it is the most
likely result given the potentially disastrous consequences that
abolishing Basic reliance might have on the viability of class actions
for securities litigation. While the Court may be prepared to revisit
the economic underpinnings of the fraud on the market rule, they are
less likely unwilling to do so at the expense of the class action
mechanism.

141. Id. at 257.
142. See id. at 259. Amgen’s evaluation of the congressional intent reads:
[T]he federal securities laws are intended to put investors into a position from which
they can help themselves by relying upon disclosures that others are obligated to make
. . . If we say that a plaintiff may recover in some circumstances even though he did
not read and rely on the defendants’ public disclosures, then no one need pay
attention to those disclosures and the method employed by Congress to achieve the
objective of the 1934 Act is defeated.
Id. (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d. 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting)).

